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Statement of Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

This Appeal is from the order of the Third

District Court entered on November 15, 2001 dismissing this
matter without prejudice.

Statement of Issue Presented for Review
Whether Defendant's debt to Plaintiff should be discharged in
bankruptcy when Defendant listed Plaintiff in the bankruptcy
filings with the last known address for Defendant and Plaintiff
had moved from that address after the agreement upon which the
debt was based was had matured.

Applicable Standard of Review
The trial court's ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss is a
matter of law and conclusions of law are reviewable for
correctness and are given no special deference on appeal.
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994)
The

primary

issue

in

this

case,

the proper

construction

and

application of section 523(a)(3)(A), is a question of law which
this court reviews de novo. In re Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d
128, 130 (5th Cir.1993).

1

Applicable Statutory Provisions
The pertinent section of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3).

"A discharge under section 727 ... does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt. ... neither listed nor scheduled
under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to
the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to
permit ... timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for
such timely filing ... "

Statement of the Case
1. On November 3, 1992 Mr. Hammond and Mr. Orr entered
into an agreement. The basic terms of the agreement
were that Mr. Hammond loaned money to Mr. Orr subject
to certain terms and conditions.

This agreement was

consummated in the exchange of the money and Mr. Orr's
signature on a piece of scratch paper.
2. At the time in which the agreement was made and during
the time in which the agreement was in effect Mr.
Hammond lived at the only address known to Mr. Orr.
3. The debt to Mr. Hammond became due and payable on or
about February 1993. Mr. Hammond never approached Mr.
Orr after the debt became past due.
4. After the debt was past due and after all contact had
ceased with Mr. Orr, Mr. Hammond moved from the
address that was known to Mr. Orr. Mr. Hammond never

A

notified Mr. Orr of the move or contacted Mr. Orr in
any manner in regards to the debt.
5. On December 30, 1994 Mr. Orr initiated bankruptcy
proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of
Utah, Case No. 94-26514.
6. Mr. Hammond was listed in the bankruptcy filing
schedules at the address where he had resided while
the debt was outstanding and where Mr. Hammond was
living at the last contact with Mr. Orr.
7. On April 17, 1995 Mr. Orr was granted a discharge in
his bankruptcy proceedings.
8. On or before November 3, 1998 Mr. Hammond came to the
knowledge that Mr. Orr had filed for bankruptcy
through researching on the Internet.
9. On November 4, 1998 Mr. Hammond filed this action.
10.

On or about November 18, 1999 Mr. Orr filed a

Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay under U.S. Bankruptcy
Code in the Utah District Court matter.

The motion

was based upon the grounds that Mr. Orr had filed a
bankruptcy and that bankruptcy was discharged.

The

motion was also based on the fact that Mr. Hammond had
been listed in the bankruptcy schedules.
11.

Mr. Orr's motion was granted and the order

dismissing this action was entered on November 15,
2001.
12.

Mr. Hammond has subsequently filed this appeal.

Summary of Argument
Despite the fact that Mr. Hammond was not provided notice of the
bankruptcy proceeding his claim was not prejudiced in anyway and
would have been dischargeable in the bankruptcy.

Mr. Orr' s

listing of Mr. Hammond at the last known address was reasonable
and was done in good faith.

Argument
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the law in Robinson v.
Mann,
powers

339 F.2d
of

547

the

bankruptcy

decisions, which
from amending

(5th Cir.1964)

had held

focusing upon the equitable

court.

The

Court

rejected

that debtors were absolutely

other
barred

their schedules after the proof-of-claim period.

Id. at 549. Unlike Birkett and Milando, which strictly construed
§523 (a) (3) against the debtor, the Robinson Court determined that
out-of-time amendments would be allowed--but only if exceptional
circumstances and equity so required.

Id. at 550.

The trial court in the instant case correctly applied the test to
determine
523(a)(3).

if

a debt

is excepted

from discharge

under

Section

However, there is no requirement that a debtor must

act in bad faith in not properly listing a particular debt for a
debt to be excepted from discharge.
285,

287

(Bankr. N.Ohio

1986);

See In re Blossom, 57 B.R.

In re Gray,

57 B.R.

(Bankr. R.I. 1986), aff?d, 60 B.R. 428 (D.R.I. 1986).

927, 931

The test is whether this debt was scheduled in time to permit a
timely request for a determination of discharge or a timely proof
of claim. Section 523(a)(3)(A) and

(B) .

In order for a debt to

be duly listed, the debtor must state the name and address of the
creditor.

Bankruptcy Rule 1007.

The burden is on the debtors to

use reasonable diligence in completing their schedules and lists.
In re Robertson, 13 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. E.Va. 1981). See also
In re Blossom, supra, 57 B.R. at 287; In re Gray, supra, 57 B.R.
at 930. If a creditor proves that an address is incorrect, the
debtor must justify the inaccuracy in preparing his schedules.
Matter

of

Robertson,

supra,

13 B.R.

careless omission is not enough.

at

731. An

incorrect

or

13 B.R. at 731.

Due process of law mandates notice is given to a creditor whose
property rights are being affected so that he may have his day in
court.

Matter

of

Frankina, 29 B.R.

983, 985

(Bankr. E.Mich.

1983) .
Section

523(a)(3)

is designed to remedy the harm to creditors

that results from not being able to participate in the bankruptcy
case. See Stark v. St. Mary's Hospital, 717 F.2d 322, 324 (7th
Cir. 1983) (the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that the right of the
creditor that is protected by section 523(a)(3)(A) is the right
to timely file a proof of claim); In re Beshensky, 68 B.R. 452,
454

(Bktcy. E.D. Wis. 1987)

(the key inquiry should be whether

the creditor has been harmed by being excluded from the schedules
and whether or not the omission was due to fraud or intentional
design).

The

"harm"

caused

by

not

receiving

notice

of

the

bankruptcy filing may involve several different aspects depending
on the particular case. Creditors are denied the opportunity to:
(1) participate in the election of a trustee, (2) ask questions
of the debtor at the meeting

of creditors,

(3) object to the

debtor's claims of exempt property,

(4) timely file a complaint

objecting

file a proof

to discharge,

(5) timely

of claim and

participate in any distribution, and (6) timely file a complaint
to determine whether a debt
(4) or

(6). It is important to note that the plain language of

§523 (a) (3) only
harm

is dischargeable under §523(a) (2),

incorporates

as

grounds

for

whatever

reason,

Congress

the

finding

last two aspects

the

chose

debt

not

to

of possible

nondischargeable.

For

provide

for

a

remedy

creditors whose only loss was the opportunity to elect a trustee,
question the debtor at the meeting of creditors, object to the
debtor's
this

claims of exempt property or object to discharge. In

case,

Mr.

Hammond

has

no

grounds

for

a

finding

of

nondischargeability under §523 (a) (3) (A).
Section

523(a)(3)(A)

excepts

from

discharge

unscheduled

debts

unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge in time to
file a proof of claim. Had this been an asset case, therefore,
Hammond would not have had notice or actual knowledge of Orr' s
bankruptcy in time to file a proof of claim. However, Orr's case
was a no-asset case.
Courts have consistently viewed no-asset cases differently under
§523 (a) (3) because, in many

jurisdictions, proofs of claim are

either unnecessary or not accepted for filing.

a

Absent a showing

of fraud or intentional omission, §523(a)(3) does not act to deny
a debtor's discharge for not listing or scheduling a creditor in
time to file a proof of claim. Samuel v. Baitcher, 781 F.2d 1529,
1534

(11th Cir. 1986); Stark v. St. Mary?s Hospital, 717 F.2d

322, 324 (7th Cir. 1983) . See also In re Beshensky, 68 B.R. 452,
454

(Bktcy. E.D. Wis. 1987) and the cases cited therein. The

cases reason that since a time is never set to file a proof of
claim in a no-asset case, the creditor is not deprived of the
opportunity

to file a proof of claim within the meaning of

§523(a) (3) .
Therefore, absent a showing of fraud or intentional omission,
Orr's debt to Hammond was discharged.
Orr

fraudulently

or

intentionally

There is no evidence that
listed

Hammond's

address

incorrectly.
If no proof-of-claim deadline has ever been set, §

523(a)(3)(A),

by its own terms, is inapplicable. In re Bulbin

(Gordon v.

Bulbin), 122 Bankr. 161, 161 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990) ; In re Hunter,
116 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990).
The

Robinson

Court

outlined

three

factors

that

courts must

consider in determining whether a debtor's failure to list a
creditor will prevent discharge of the unscheduled debt. Courts
must

examine

1) the reasons

the debtor

failed

to

list the

creditor, 2) the amount of disruption which would likely occur,
and 3) any prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the
unlisted

creditor

in question. Although

the bankruptcy

court

strictly construed the failure-to-list provision, that court made

findings of fact that permit this Court to review the case sub
judice in light of the three Robinson factors.
1. Reasons For The Failure To File
As the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have determined, a
court should not discharge a debt under section 523(a)(3) if the
debtor*s

failure to schedule that debt was due to
or

improper

motive.

Soult,

894

intentional

design,

fraud,

F.2d

at 817;

[**16]

Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534; Rosinski, 759 F.2d at 541;

Stark, 717 F.2d at 323-34. If the failure is attributable solely
to

negligence

or

inadvertence,

however,

equity

points

toward

discharge of the debt.
In this case, Orr's failure to list Mr. Hammond's correct address
on the section 521(1) schedules was completely due to mistake or
inadvertence. In fact, there is no evidence whatever demonstrated
that Mr. Orr had fraudulently or intentionally failed to list Mr.
Hammond's

current

address

on

the

schedule.

Hence,

the

first

factor supports discharge.

2. Disruption To The Courts
The second factor focuses on undue disruption to courts1 dockets.
While bankruptcy courts will certainly experience some disruption
by allowing

debtors

submit proofs

to amend their schedules and creditors to

of claims outside the Rule 3002(c) time period,

such disruption is not so inordinate as to tip the scales against
discharging the debt.

Here, Mr. Hammond has not suggested even

one way in which the discharge can or will unduly disrupt the
courts, and this Court finds that no such disruption would occur.
Therefore, the second factor likewise favors discharge.

3. Prejudice to Creditors
Without question, the third factor, which focuses on prejudice to
the creditors—in conjunction with the first factor—is the most
critical.
receive

Creditors

their

share

determinations

are

are
of

prejudiced
dividends

only
and

compromised.

if

their

obtain

Soult,

894

rights

to

dischargeability
F.2d

at

817;

Rosinski, 759 F.2d at 542; see also In re Haga (Haga v. National
Union

Fire

Insurance

(Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991)
considered

[the

Company),

(stating

omitted

that

creditor!s

131

Bankr.

"Congress
rights

to

320,

326

apparently

only

share

any

in

distribution and obtain a determination of dischargeability] as
being material because only the inability to timely file a proof
of

claim and a dischargeability

action are

sufficient

grounds

under the Code to penalize the debtor" (citing In re Anderson, 72
Bankr. 783, 786 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987))).
The Sixth Circuit explained
applies

"only if

in Rosinski that section

523(a)(3)

[the] failure to include the creditor on the

original schedule can be shown to have prejudiced him in some way
or to have been part of a scheme of fraud or intentional design."
759 F.2d at 541; see also Soult, 894 F.2d at 817

(determining

that bankruptcy courts may reopen cases so as to allow amendment

11

of schedules and discharge of debt if the "failure to schedule a
debt was simply inadvertent and did not prejudice the creditor in
any way").
No creditor has been or will be prejudiced here. Indeed, Mr.
Hammond's rights to participate in dividends would not be any
different had they been listed first on the schedules.
Further, Mr. Hammond only dischargeability claim arises from the
failure-to-list

statute. There

is no

question

but

that Mr.

Hammond has had full opportunity to develop, brief, and argue
that

claim

before

this

Court

and

the

district.

Hence, Mr.

Hammond7 s right to have his dischargeability claim decided has
not been compromised in any way. Additionally, the parties have
not

suggested

any way

that

a listed

creditor's

right

to a

dischargeability decision could be prejudiced here. Thus, the
third

factor,

like

the

first

and

second

factors,

favors

discharge.
Because Mr. Orr's failure to list Mr. Hammond as a creditor was
solely due to mistake or inadvertence and because Mr. Hammond was
scheduled in time to protect his rights, section 523(a)(3)(A) is
inapplicable here.

Conclusion
This court holds equitable powers to determine whether the debt
should have been dischargeable.

Under the definition embodied in

§523 (a)(3) when there is a no-asset bankruptcy filing, such as
this case by Mr. Orr, §523 (a)(3) does not apply.

Even if Mr.

Hammond was not given notice in time to file a proof of claim.
However, this being a no-asset case, proof of claim would not be
filed.
Despite the fact that Mr. Hammond was not provided notice of the
bankruptcy proceeding his claim was not prejudiced in anyway and
would have been dischargeable in the bankruptcy.
Mr. Orr's listing of Mr. Hammond at the last known address was
reasonable and was done in good faith.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd Day of July 2002.
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